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ABSTRACT 
Author: Boon S. Koo 
Title: An Econometric Analysis of the NW/KLM 
Corporate Alliance 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Business AdministratiON in Aviation 
Year: 1993 
This thesis investigates whether a corporate alliance 
between international air carriers is beneficial, 
considering the changes in the global air transport system. 
Dividing the research method into three phases, the author 
first lists and identifies the recent changes in world air 
transport trends. Then, the author defines the different 
types of alliances and studies the advantages and 
disadvantages of these corporate alliances. Finally, a 
multiple regression analysis is performed using the 
KLM/Northwest Airlines alliance as a case analysis. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Problem Statement 
The central issue of this thesis is to study whether 
corporate alliances between international air carriers are 
beneficial, considering the changes in the world air 
transport system. A qualitative and a quantitative study of 
corporate alliances is conducted in this thesis. 
Specifically, the author's goal is to define the different 
types of corporate alliances and investigate the advantages 
and disadvantages of them. The KLM/Northwest Airlines 
alliance is used as the basis for a quantitative study. 
B. Hypothesis 
This thesis utilizes the inductive approach where a 
conclusion is drawn after an analysis of the facts. For 
example, after gathering information from selected sources 
and references, and analyzing the data, the author concluded 
that corporate alliances between international air carriers 
is beneficial. Therefore, an a priori hypothesis is not 
needed. 
1 
2 
C. Introduction 
Since U.S. domestic airline deregulation (Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978), the previously conservative 
international air traffic system and structure has 
confronted and instituted changes. Moreover, U.S. 
deregulation has significantly altered the domestic market 
of the United States. Through the adaptation phase of 
deregulation, those airlines that successfully survived the 
environment of open competition have become more efficient 
and competitive. 
While utilizing the aforementioned trend as a resource, 
the national interest of the U.S. is to increase its share 
of the international air transportation market. 
Furthermore, liberalization spread through some of the world 
air transport industry in the 1980s, bringing about 
revolutionary changes which wore away some of the 
traditional regulatory system aspects in certain 
countries.l 
Owing to the U.S. megacarriers', such as the American, 
United, and Delta Airlines, aggressive penetration into some 
foreign markets, the European nations, in concert with their 
planned 1992 economic integration, began to plan a 
consolidation process for an intra-European air transport 
market. The objective is to survive the strong challenge 
'Daniel, Kasper. Deregulation and Globalization. New York: 
Ballinger Publication. 1988. 
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from the U.S., protect their national carriers from 
international competitors, and elevate their bargaining 
power in bilateral agreements with other nations.2 
Besides the national and regional changes, several 
technical modifications and innovations have occurred in the 
air transport industry. Privatization of companies 
previously owned and controlled by national governments has 
taken place for the purpose of promoting and stimulating 
efficiency and increasing productivity.3 Hub and spoke 
systems were inaugurated in the U.S. which increased the 
productivity of resources and efficiency in scheduling 
aircraft. This has led to congestion and saturation at some 
hub airports during popular departure times. Hence, access 
to these airports has become restricted due to limited gates 
and landing slots.4 Airlines that were able to obtain 
gates and slots prior to congestion and saturation of these 
busy airports dominated these hubs with increased 
frequencies and abundant destinations, while potential 
competitors were unable to compete due to a lack of gates 
and slots. 
2Mark W. Lyon, "Pacific Rim Carriers Meet the Threat of 
Protectionism", Airline Executive, December 1989, 27. 
3Kevin B. Boberg and Frederick M. Collison, International 
Trends in the Pacific Basin, Transportation Journal, Vol.28, No.3 
(Spring 1989), 28. 
4Paul Proctor, "System Capacity May Limit Pacific Rim 
Traffic Growth", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 February 
1990, p. 41. 
4 
Also, the invention and improvement of the Computer 
Reservation System (CRS) took place enabling airlines with 
their own systems to become more productive and efficient 
compared to competitors. The CRSs are being used as a 
distribution tool for expansion into foreign markets. 
Besides, the concept of CRS is branching out beyond air 
travel and into general electronic information sales. These 
CRS create new revenue streams which contribute to the 
profits of each carrier.5 
In developing strategies to compete effectively against 
some of the U.S. megacarriers, European and Asian airlines 
have been rapidly increasing their global reach through 
marketing alliances, code sharing, and joint-service routes 
with other U.S. carriers. This strategy enables them to 
gain access to new markets while minimizing financial risk. 
This trend is forecast to expand significantly in the 
future, since this corporate strategy allows the foreign 
carriers to circumvent the current restrictive bilateral air 
service agreements in place with the U.S.b Therefore, it 
is fair to say that the issue of corporate alliances will 
remain one of the most complex and controversial topics in 
the global air transport industry. 
5Paul S. Dempsey, "Turbulence in the Open Skies: The 
Deregulation of International Air Transport", The Transportation 
Law Journal, (1987), 46. 
bPaul Proctor, Marketing Alliances, "Joint Services Help 
Asian Airlines Extend Reach", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
26 November 1990, pp. 74,75. 
CHAPTER II 
CORPORATE AIRLINE ALLIANCE 
A. What is a Corporate Airline Alliance 
An airline alliance is a partnership between two or 
more air carriers. The three forms of alliances are: simple 
alliance, strong alliance, and corporate merger. The three 
alliances are differentiated depending upon the amount of 
capital investment and the variation in the form of the 
functional agreements between airlines. A simple alliance 
consists of a generic marketing alliance, code-sharing, and 
joint-service routes between two or more airlines without 
any substantial amount of capital investment from each. A 
strong alliance includes all the functions served by a 
simple alliance with the addition of obtaining a stake in 
the other airline's equity. Lastly, a corporate merger 
involves one airline taking over the ownership control of 
another airline. 
The three types of alliances present different 
advantages and disadvantages for airlines seeking to use an 
alliance as a corporate strategy to compete domestically 
and/or globally. Therefore, each airline must conduct a 
5 
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careful analysis to determine its needs and circumstances 
before implementing a particular alliance. 
Since a simple alliance does not require any capital 
investment on the part of the two airlines, it enables an 
airline to minimize its financial risk if confronted with an 
incompetent partner. Also, airlines can implement and/or 
terminate the agreement with great flexibility and, 
moreover, negotiate only for guaranteed agreement terms. 
For example, initiating a Special Prorate Agreement (SPA) 
between a foreign and a U.S. airline has been popular. It 
allows the foreign airline to transport an international 
passenger beyond its designated U.S. gateway or point of 
entry. In return, the U.S. carriers are able to transfer 
these international passengers into their domestic route 
system, thereby increasing their domestic traffic revenues. 
However, if the specific U.S. airline were to impose an 
unanticipated fare burden on the passenger of a foreign 
airline, the foreign airline could negotiate for more 
equitable terms with a different airline without suffering 
any penalties. A good example is the case between Thai 
International Airlines and American Airlines. Thai 
International Airlines ceased their SPA with American 
Airlines in 1992 and implemented an SPA with Delta Airlines 
when Delta offered them a preferable discount rate for their 
passengers. Thus, if one airline were to realize that its 
partner was not rendering service up to agreed standards, a 
7 
simple alliance can be unilaterally terminated. Therefore, 
a lack of commitment between two partners to sacrifice for 
their mutual benefit is probably the biggest disadvantage of 
a simple alliance. 
Although a strong alliance is an extension of a simple 
alliance, it is different in terms of capital investment 
requirements. Specifically, the capital investment of one 
airline in the other exposes the investing airline to 
substantial financial risk if the partner was to declare 
bankruptcy. In exchange, the benefits that can be obtained 
through this particular agreement are far greater than from 
the simple alliance. The main benefit comes from the 
greater degree of mutual commitment and dedication between 
the two airlines. Also, it is more difficult to terminate 
the alliance, which creates a more permanent relationship. 
In addition, the airlines can integrate their operations 
more easily. Examples of this integration are implementing 
joint-service routes, sharing catering and fueling services, 
utilizing a single aircraft maintenance facility, honoring 
both frequent-flyer programs, and mutually investing, 
allocating, and utilizing their computer reservation 
systems. All this coordination and integration can help 
both airlines reduce their operating costs and improve their 
competitive positions. 
A corporate merger, the third form of alliance, can 
present significant growth to the parent airline. From a 
8 
merger, the dominate airline will acquire the capital and 
the infrastructure (gates, slots, terminals, CRS) of the 
former competitor, realize economies of scale, and, to a 
degree, enjoy decreased competition. Nevertheless, not all 
elements of a corporate merger are beneficial. The 
possibility of depleting current assets and/or increasing 
liability through the merging process must not be 
overlooked. If an uncontrollable external catastrophe was 
to occur (fuel shortage crisis, war, conflicts with labor 
unions, general downturn in the economy), the ability to 
sustain the inflated size of the company could be far more 
difficult to engineer than if the company was more modestly 
sized. In Table 1, the major advantages and disadvantages 
of different airline alliance types are summarized. 
9 
Table 1. A Summary of the Major Advantages and Disadvantages 
of Different Airline Alliance Types 
AIRLINE ALLIANCE 
TYPES 
SIMPLE ALLIANCE 
STRONG ALLIANCE 
CORPORATE MERGER 
MAJOR ADVANTAGES 
* The ability to 
sustain and 
operate under 
their own unique 
corp. identity 
* The absence of 
financial burden 
* The ability to 
avoid financial 
losses caused by 
its partner 
* The simplicity 
of implementing 
procedures 
* The presence of 
mutual commitment 
between alliance 
partners 
* The ability to 
monetarily profit 
from partner's 
stock valuation 
* The ability to 
increase market 
share and decrease 
competition 
* The ability to 
attain a global 
critical mass 
MAJOR 
DISADVANTAGES 
* The relatively 
s imp1e 
terminating 
procedures 
* The lack of 
mutual commitment 
to support and 
sacrifice between 
alliance partners 
* The possibility 
of financial 
losses caused by 
partner's failure 
*The inability to 
unilaterally 
terminate the 
alliance 
* The danger of 
being inflexible 
to market 
fluctuations 
* The financial 
burden of 
investment 
* The 
confrontation 
with native 
governments on 
local anti-trust 
regulations 
Source: Shin, W. Oh. "A Study of Air Transport Marketing 
Strategies" (Graduate Thesis, In-Ha University, 
1991), pp. 80-84. 
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B. The Goal of Forming An Alliance 
The primary goal for forming an alliance is to provide 
what the industry calls a "seamless product." The seamless 
product, within the context of air travel, requires the 
ability of an air carrier alliance to provide service to 
customers without their being aware that they are dealing 
with more than one company. Expressed in another way, it is 
similar to "one stop shopping." With one-stop shopping, the 
customer is able to purchase a ticket to any destination 
within the route system of the alliance as an "on-line" 
alliance customer. The customer will be served as if the 
entire flight was carried out by one carrier, even if one or 
more switches between carriers are made at intermediate 
stops. Hence, convenience in re-boarding procedures can be 
realized by every air traveller. 
In addition, alliances can help to attain political and 
operational goals. Politically, in order to circumvent the 
current restrictive bilateral air service agreements in 
place between nations, an alliance allows a foreign air 
carrier to operate within a foreign country without waiting 
for renegotiation of the bilateral air service agreement. 
Operationally, efficiency can be achieved through sharing 
infrastructure (gates, slots, terminals), service 
departments (catering, fueling), and honoring mutual 
promotional benefits. Therefore, when all the elements of 
the goals are aggregated, implementation of an alliance 
11 
should provide the respective airlines a competitive edge 
over competing U.S. and/or international airlines. 
C. Existing U.S. Alliances 
Of all the U.S. domestic air carriers, the most active 
carriers in negotiating corporate alliances with foreign 
airlines are Delta and Northwest Airlines. These two 
carriers were ranked in 1992 as the third and fourth largest 
air carriers in the U.S. in terms of passenger revenue 
miles. The main reasons these air carriers vigorously 
pursue a corporate alliance are the added benefits of 
network coverage, frequency competitiveness, and the 
increased operational efficiency larger carriers enjoy 
domestically and globally (American and United).7 These 
two airlines, and with the recent addition of U.S. Air, 
realize that the absence of a corporate alliance would only 
allow them to be niche carriers competing in specific 
markets. In addition, a foreign monetary injection to some 
airlines with a weak financial status could allow them to 
maintain their competitive position in their respective 
markets. Hence, a corporate alliance has become an 
important strategic tool to fulfill an objective of 
sustaining competitiveness. 
7Michael Harrington and Torbjorn Kihlstedt, "Wedding 
Night Jitters," Airline Business, December 1991, p. 13. 
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The NW/KLM Alliance. Northwest Airlines is currently 
ranked the fourth largest carrier in the U.S. domestic air 
transportation industry in terms of revenue passenger miles. 
However, industry experts indicate that it is too highly 
leveraged and must somehow expand both in the U.S. and 
overseas if it is to have any chance of being competitive in 
the global air transport industry. In this respect, 
Northwest Airlines, under CEO Al Checchi, initiated a 
corporate alliance agreement with Dutch carrier KLM in 1989. 
KLM invested $3.68 billion U.S. dollars in Northwest 
Airlines. In return, KLM holds 20% of Northwest's parent 
company's (Wings Holding) common stock, which also 
represents 20.5% of the voting stock.8 
This alliance between Northwest and KLM enabled both 
parties to mutually expand market links by using the 
"seamless product" concept. A vast on-line and single code 
network ensured that a passenger is funnelled into the 
Northwest/KLM system. Also, being able to provide a more 
convenient re-boarding procedure enhances their service 
quality and benefits their overall advertising campaign. 
Moreover, plans to integrate their sales operations will 
allow both Northwest and KLM to market each other's 
passenger and cargo operations, coordinate schedules, plan 
joint strategic objectives, pool revenue, market third party 
8Jean Cole, "Northwest's Global Reach," Minnesota 
Pioneer Press, 19 August 1992, p. E4. 
13 
services, and share personnel. This alliance has great 
potential to increase the productivity and efficiency of 
both carriers. 
Other than the alliance with KLM, Northwest has also 
aggressively sought to implement multiple alliances. Table 
2 provides the percentage figures of KLM and Northwest 
Airlines' equity stake in other airlines. In 1991, 
Northwest made a bid for 80% of Philippine Airlines, for 
more than $370 million U.S. dollars. The rationale and 
purpose of this alliance was to capitalize on Philippine 
Airlines' extensive route network in Southeast Asia and to 
establish a major maintenance facility in the Philippines.11 
This alliance could provide Northwest with a significant 
decrease in maintenance costs due to lower labor costs in 
the Philippines, while Northwest would also have the 
opportunity to enjoy a stake in the high traffic growth 
rates in the Pacific air transport market. However, the 
domestic U.S. airline unions oppose foreign repair stations, 
and this has been the biggest hurdle in implementing the 
alliance. 
Northwest's vision of a global network also includes a 
49% stake in Qantas Airways, an Australian carrier. 
Northwest envisioned its current partner, KLM, and future 
potential partners, Philippine Airlines and Qantas Airways, 
qJean Cole, "Northwest's Global Reach," Minnesota 
Pioneer Press, 19 August 19 91, p. E4. 
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as forming a global network of airlines that could surpass 
the efficiency and productivity of all competitors in the 
respective regions. 
Although the intentions of Northwest are considered to 
be sound, the issue of capacity has to be confronted and 
solved by Northwest Airlines. Compared to some other U.S. 
megacarriers (United, American, and Delta) , Northwest is 
currently limited in gates and slots. Therefore, without 
plans for expansion, Northwest would not be able to offer 
its partner and future partners adequate access to U.S. 
markets. Northwest made plans to acquire Midway Airlines 
and become a prime contender in the bidding process for 
Continental. Unfortunately, the U.S. airline industry has 
experienced a severe downturn in the 1990s. Once dominant 
megacarriers, such as American and United Airlines, have 
recorded staggering financial losses, and Northwest is not 
an exception. Hence, the required financial muscle for 
Northwest to make the needed expansion has to come from 
external sources at this time. 
KLM is currently seeking an alliance with British 
Airways. If the proposed alliance takes place, Northwest 
would indirectly benefit by being able to receive the needed 
capital for expansion, plus an extended network of 
international routes. If all the anticipated alliances and 
the desired growth of Northwest are successful, Northwest 
will certainly be in a position as one of the leaders in the 
15 
U.S. and the global air transport industry. 
Table 2. KLM and Northwest Airlines' Equity Stakes 
CARRIER 
KLM 
NORTHWEST 
PARTNER 
Air UK 
MARTINAIR 
KLM CITYHOPPER 
NORTHWEST 
TRANSAVIA 
HAWAIIAN 
PHILIPPINE * 
QANTAS * 
CARRIER'S EQUITY 
in PARTNER (%) 
14.9 
29.8 
100 
20 
40 
25 
80 
49 
* Potential alliance partners 
Source: M. Harrington and T. Kihlstedt, "Wedding Night 
Jitters," Airline Business, December 1991, p. 17. 
Delta's Alliances. In order to maintain their position 
as the third largest air carrier in the U.S. domestic air 
transport industry (in terms of revenue passenger miles in 
1992) and to maintain their competitiveness in the global 
air transport industry, Delta Airlines set up a three-
airline alliance network with Swissair and Singapore 
Airlines in 1989. This particular alliance is a strong 
alliance involving equity swaps among the three carriers. 
Delta obtained a five percent equity stake in Swissair and a 
three percent equity stake in Singapore Airlines. Singapore 
16 
Airlines secured five percent of Delta and three percent of 
Swissair, while Swissair acquired five percent of Delta and 
one percent of Singapore Airlines' stocks. Table 3 shows 
Delta Airlines' alliance activity. 
Although the initial process of building global linkups 
between international carriers was forecast to be complex 
and time consuming (due to the difficulty of integrating 
different computer systems, flight schedules, and corporate 
cultures), the three airlines aggressively developed the 
alliance. The benefits of integrating three carriers that 
serve three different yet important markets (U.S., Europe, 
and Pacific) were projected by all respective carriers to 
provide concrete dividends and efficiency. An advantage of 
this alliance was that it provided an opportunity for these 
three carriers to offer a seamless product to international 
air travellers having beyond point-of-entry destinations. 
Delta Airlines extended Swissair and Singapore Airlines 
rights to a priority display on its international 
reservation system to generate more traffic. Hence, the 
ability to offer better service in terms of increased 
frequencies, more worldwide destinations, and enhanced 
convenience and comfort for international travellers (from 
simplifying the re-boarding procedures) has put the three 
airlines in a more competitive position in the global air 
transport industry. Moreover, the capability to create more 
traffic demand from the industry by using favorable 
17 
reservation displays has added to the benefits of the three 
airlines. Additionally, joint use of aircraft and personnel 
between Swissair and Singapore Airlines, joint flights, 
revenue pooling, sharing maintenance facilities, and 
enhanced communication links between the three carriers were 
cost saving gains of this particular alliance. 
If the implemented alliance was to mature and develop 
a stronger tie, the three carriers would be able to attain 
critical mass, increase international network coverage, 
reduce operating costs, and become more efficient globally, 
which will eventually impose significant threats to the U.S. 
megacarriers and some other international carriers. 
Table 3. Delta Airlines' Equity Stake 
CARRIER 
DELTA 
PARTNER 
SINGAPORE 
SWISSAIR 
EQUITY (%) 
2.8 
5 
Source: M. Harrington and T. Kihlstedt, "Wedding Night 
Jitters," Airline Business, December 1991, p. 17. 
USAir Alliance. Although USAir is ranked as the fourth 
largest air carrier in the U.S. domestic air transport 
market (in terms of revenue passenger miles) in 1992, USAir 
is currently operating without a significant stake in the 
international aviation market. Therefore, USAir's success 
is heavily dependant upon two elements: traffic volume 
18 
growth in the U.S. domestic air transport market and the 
competition in its domestic markets. Unfortunately, in the 
1990s, the U.S. domestic air transport market has been 
growing slowly and has also been extremely competitive. 
Consequently, USAir has lost more than one billion U.S. 
dollars before taxes in the last two years.10 In addition, 
severe price competition has reduced yields and the 
profitability of the U.S. air transport industry overall, 
leaving USAir with a total debt of more than two billion 
U.S. dollars. The only carrier that has remained profitable 
is Southwest Airlines, which is considered a niche carrier 
in the U.S. domestic air transport market.11 
Unlike Southwest, USAir competes directly against major 
U.S. carriers and airlines operating under Chapter XI 
bankruptcy protection. Hence, USAir is at a disadvantage 
competing against carriers that can off-set their domestic 
losses with international revenues and carriers who can 
offer fares that are below marginal costs (TWA, Continental, 
and America West) .12 
In devising a survival strategy, USAir chose to seek 
corporate alliances with foreign airlines. The alliance 
10Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose 
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 30. 
nMead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose 
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 30. 
12David Cammeron, "Every Questions Answered," Airline 
Business, April 1992, p. 51. 
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benefits expected by USAir are a much needed injection of 
capital and the generation of traffic feed from its 
partner's international hub to USAir's domestic hub. In 
return, USAir's position of being the largest carrier (by 
departures) at Boston, New York/La Guardia, Philadelphia, 
Washington National, Charlotte, Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, 
and Tampa provided prominent leverage to international 
carriers seeking feed in the north-eastern U.S. markets.13 
In addition, considering the absence of international 
service rights by USAir, an alliance partner's worry about 
servicing redundant international routes would not exist, 
which makes an alliance more appealing to any international 
carrier. 
In 1992, USAir initiated a simple alliance with Air 
Canada to promote joint fares, implement marketing 
coordination, enforce code sharing, and integrate frequent 
flyer programs. The agreement also contained a pledge to 
change the simple alliance into a strong alliance in the 
future, which will enable both airlines to offer joint 
purchasing rights for equipment, share maintenance, gates, 
slots and technical facilities, and an equity swap. The 
benefit gained by both carriers was mutually increased 
traffic feed from one's hub to the other's. 
Apart from the simple alliance with Air Canada, USAir 
nMead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose 
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 30. 
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is on the verge of inaugurating a strong alliance with 
British Airlines. British Airlines has offered USAir an 
investment of $750 million. In return, BA will obtain 44% 
of USAir's capital share and 21% voting rights.14 If the 
proposed alliance takes place, the potential benefit for 
both airlines will be the ability to offer a seamless 
product. Secondly, cost savings can be realized by both 
carriers through joint purchasing, catering, and sharing of 
structural facilities and personnel. Since the combined 
annual operating costs for both airlines exceeds $14 
billion, a potential 1% reduction in cost can mount up to 
$140 million; in the long run, there is the possibility of a 
gradual increase, percentage wise.15 
USAir's plan for implementing an alliance with BA is 
currently experiencing severe challenges from its 
competitors. United, American, and Delta Airlines are 
strongly opposed to the alliance. They contend that putting 
BA and USAir together would create the world's largest 
airline by passenger numbers, with 80 million passengers 
carried in 1991. Also, the issue of cabotage is an element 
raised by USAir's competitors. The competition claims that 
the USAir/BA alliance will indirectly allow BA to get around 
the current restrictive U.S. cabotage rights. Therefore, 
14Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose 
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 30. 
15Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose 
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 31. 
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without an equitable exchange of rights such as allowing 
U.S. carriers to operate within Europe, these competing 
carriers argue that the alliance between USAir and BA must 
be stopped by the U.S. government. USAir and its 45,000 
employees have a different perspective. They insist that 
the proposed alliance should be granted by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation based on two reasons. First, 
if the proposed alliance is denied, the ability of USAir to 
survive in the current competitive U.S. domestic air 
transport market is questionable. Second, the job security 
of its 45,000 employees will be in jeopardy.16 
D. Challenges of Alliances 
The benefits of implementing an alliance between some 
U.S. airlines and other international carriers would be 
positive for the respective airlines for a variety of 
reasons. These include reduced costs, increased efficiency, 
better utilization of resources, and enhanced service 
quality for international passengers. However, there are 
external and internal challenges associated with an 
alliance. 
Externally, the respective governments have the power 
to veto any alliance agreement in order to protect the 
interests of their national or flag carrier. Since an 
lbMead Jennings, "BA Stakes Out USAir," Airline 
Business, August 19 92, p. 10. 
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alliance agreement between a U.S. and a foreign air carrier 
enables the foreign carrier to legally transport U.S. 
passengers domestically and internationally, the U.S. 
government imposes restrictions to limit the alliance 
agreements. For example, Korean Airlines negotiated a Code 
Sharing Agreement with TWA in 1990 to transport U.S. 
passengers from Honolulu to Los Angeles. Without a Code 
Sharing Agreement, offering services on this particular 
route is illegal for Korean Airlines. A popular tactic used 
by the U.S. government to restrict the alliance formation 
process is to invoke anti-trust laws. The coordination of 
prices between airline partners in an alliance is a direct 
violation of U.S. anti-trust laws. In addition, limiting 
foreign ownership of U.S. airlines is another method of 
restricting alliances. Presently, 49% foreign ownership of 
a U.S. carrier is allowed with no more than 25% voting 
rights and no more than one third foreign representation on 
the U.S. firm's board of directors.17 Other foreign 
governments impose even stricter foreign ownership 
limitations, except for Australia. The Australian 
government has foreign ownership limitation laws identical 
to those of the U.S. On the other hand, the Japanese 
government does not allow a foreign corporation to invest in 
a Japanese firm, while the British government imposes a 
17Mead Jennings, "BA Stakes Out USAir," Airline 
Business, August 1992, p. 10. 
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significantly more restrictive foreign investment law (25% 
foreign ownership and no more than 10% voting rights).18 
The intentions of all these restrictions by local 
governments is to simultaneously protect the local industry 
from foreign penetration and to provide leverage for their 
local air carriers to obtain favorable terms from other 
governments with more liberal policies and more global 
distribution possibilities. 
Apart from governmental challenges, another external 
difficulty of implementing an alliance is the objection from 
competitors and labor unions. The recent alliance 
discussions between BA and USAir are an excellent example. 
Bob Crandall, the CEO of American Airlines, has stated that 
he had serious intentions of putting American Airlines up 
for sale if the proposed alliance were to go through. The 
rationale behind his statement is twofold. First, he fears 
that permitting the deal will provide his competitors 
considerable market benefits, assuming the proposed alliance 
can be made to function effectively. Second, it is a way to 
register a complaint regarding his inability to undertake 
similar investments in European carriers, although the rules 
have yet to be tested by a real bid. Moreover, the 
inability of American Airlines to obtain increased traffic 
rights beyond the UK has been a significant factor in its 
18
"BA-USAir Forces Another Bermuda," Airline Business, 
November 1992, p.7. 
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complaints. Crandall insists that the U.S. DOT (Department 
of Transportation) must secure equal opportunities for U.S. 
carriers, through amending the existing bilateral air 
agreement between the U.K. and the U.S., before the proposed 
alliance is approved. Crandall would like new U.S. gateways 
to London; allowing U.S. carriers as many routes out of 
Heathrow as U.K. carriers have; unlimited access to 
secondary U.K. cities; more liberal capacity and fares 
control; more beyond rights; reciprocal opportunities to buy 
into U.K. carriers; and better access to slots at 
Heathrow.1" In this sense, Crandall's view has validity if 
market access is the critical issue; therefore, his position 
becomes one of the hurdles of an alliance. However, 
Crandall's fear of his competition becoming more productive 
through an alliance is considered as merely an insecurity 
factor fueling his strong opposing view of an alliance. 
The airline labor unions are also strongly opposed to 
these types of alliances. They claim that their jobs would 
be lost if they had to compete against some foreign labor 
rates that are considerably lower than theirs. Any form of 
an alliance that enables airlines to share personnel and 
structural facilities, such as maintenance, catering, and 
ticketing facilities, could indeed affect job security and 
the viability of U.S. airline labor unions. Consequently, 
1C)Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose 
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 30. 
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the airline labor unions are actively lobbying governmental 
regulatory groups to block any proposed alliances between 
U.S. and foreign airlines. 
Another alliance challenge is the probable internal 
conflict between the alliance partners. The dispute over 
national pride, ownership, conservatism, and the belief in 
the "our way of doing things is best" concept has a major 
effect on the viability of an alliance. Although most 
airline managers would find merit in an alliance which would 
leave them in a leading role in the global air transport 
industry, in international markets, equal partnerships are 
noted to be difficult to forge and even harder to sustain. 
Therefore, resistance to transborder acquisitions will be 
particularly high when the forces of nationalism are brought 
to bear. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHOD and ANALYSIS 
A. Rationale for Using a Regression Model 
Although this thesis has qualitatively discussed the 
advantages and disadvantages of implementing an alliance, 
the student wanted to test and evaluate alliances using a 
quantitative analytical technique. A regression analysis was 
used to study whether implementing an alliance has any 
measurable quantitative gains and/or losses for the 
respective airlines. 
In the regression model, the student hypothesized that 
the aggregate traffic revenue of KLM would increase, 
depending on the increased number of U.S. domestic 
destinations gained from a corporate alliance with Northwest 
Airlines. Therefore, the prediction of increased traffic 
revenue can be quantified once the number of increased 
destinations has been established. In this regression 
model, KLM's traffic revenue is designated as the dependant 
variable and the number of destinations as an independent 
variable. Thus, the numerical benefit and/or cost of an 
alliance in terms of traffic revenue can be tested and 
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measured. 
A regression analysis enables the student to quantify 
the increase or decrease in KLM's traffic revenue by taking 
the increased number of destinations into account. However, 
predictions of the dependant variable (KLM'S traffic 
revenue) based on a model containing only a single 
independent variable (number of destinations) may be too 
simplistic. For example, the gross domestic product (GDP) 
of the Netherlands, the currency exchange rate between the 
U.S. and the Netherlands, the available seat miles (ASM) of 
KLM, and the fare levels of KLM could pose a significant 
influence over the changes in KLM's traffic revenue. Hence, 
a multiple regression analysis which considers more 
independent variables should provide a more precise 
quantitative prediction of the dependant variable, KLM's 
traffic revenue. 
In summary, assuming that alliances are beneficial 
overall, the student would expect the multiple regression 
model to show that KLM's traffic revenues increased after 
the alliance. 
B. Regression Model 
Model Variables and Data Sources. The KLM/Northwest 
Airlines alliance was selected as a case analysis for this 
thesis. The main reason is that KLM and Northwest Airlines 
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were the first major airlines to develop a strong alliance 
in 1989. Prior to the alliance between KLM and Northwest 
Airlines, there were simple alliances between various 
international carriers. However, the goal of this project 
was to use a strong alliance as a study case and to perform 
a regression analysis of this alliance in order to quantify 
the benefits of such a permanent alliance. Therefore, a 
simple alliance which entails agreements such as joint 
marketing, code-sharing, and joint pooling was not selected 
since it is not as long lasting or substantial. Simple 
alliances can be easily terminated unilaterally depending on 
the needs of a particular airline. 
For the multiple regression analysis, KLM's aggregate 
semi-annual traffic revenue was chosen as the dependant 
variable. The U.S. GDP growth rate, the currency exchange 
rate between Netherlands Guilders and U.S. cents, KLM's 
average one-way economy fare from Amsterdam to St. Paul/ 
"Minneapolis, and the number of KLM's U.S. gates from 1986 to 
1991 were selected to be the independent variables. That 
is, the student wanted to investigate whether KLM's traffic 
revenue would respond to changes in the U.S. GDP growth 
rate, U.S. domestic destinations, KLM's fare levels, and the 
currency exchange rate between Netherlands guilders and U.S. 
cents. The sample years from 1986 to 1991 were specifically 
selected to allow a "before and after" alliance comparison. 
To be more precise, the student wanted to study whether 
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KLM's traffic revenue increased after its alliance with 
Northwest Airlines in 1989. 
KLM's aggregate traffic revenue, currency conversion 
rates between Netherlands and the U.S., and the number of 
KLM's U.S. gates were obtained primarily from the annual 
financial reports of KLM and Northwest Airlines. The U.S. 
GDP growth rate data are published by the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Data on KLM's average economy fare from 
Amsterdam, Netherlands to St. Paul/Minneapolis were acquired 
from Assistant Manager Jackie Thon, who currently works for 
the International Tariff Department at the U.S. Department 
of Transportation, located in Washington D.C. 
In Table 4, the number of KLM's U.S. gates remained the 
same from 1986 through 1988. With the addition of 
Baltimore, Orlando, and Halifax, it increased to thirteen in 
1989. However, after the alliance with Northwest Airlines, 
it dramatically increased to 211. Most of these 211 U.S. 
gates are served by Northwest Airlines. 
The U.S. GDP growth rate increased steadily from 1986 
through 1988. The highest growth percentage rate reached 
7.9% in 1988. But from 1989 it decreased, falling to its 
lowest growth rate of 2.9% in 1991. The downturn of the 
U.S. economy and the decrease in consumer demand confidence 
are the major contributing factors to this decrease. 
The currency exchange rate from 1986 through 1991 
fluctuated constantly around a general growth trend. 
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Therefore, a regular or predictable growth pattern or cycle 
cannot be observed. The inability to control the value of 
U.S. currency in international markets and the inability to 
predict global political changes are reasons for the 
inconsistent fluctuations in the currency exchange rate 
between the U.S. and the Netherlands. 
The one-way economy fare charged by KLM from 1986 
through 1991 increased on a semi-annual basis. The two 
biggest increases were in 1990 (11%) and in 1991 (13%) . 
However, the KLM fare shown in Table 4 is only one out of 
more than 150 fares offered by KLM from the Netherlands to 
the U.S. The results of the regression model will be 
affected by the necessity of selecting one fare to represent 
the "price" of the air service. 
KLM's traffic revenue increased in 1987, 1989, 1990 and 
decreased in 1988 and 1991 with respect to the previous 
years. The biggest increase was in 1989 and 1990 (14% and 
22%). The major influence of this increase seems to be the 
changes in the number of KLM's U.S. gates. In 1989, there 
was an increase of three gates and in 1990, there was an 
increase of almost 200. Although the number of gates 
remained the same in 1991, KLM's traffic revenue decreased 
by 12% compared to the figures in 1990. A significant 
decrease in the U.S. GDP growth rate can be considered the 
prime factor for this decrease. 
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Table 4. Summary of 
Analysis 
YEAR 
JUNE 86 
DEC. 86 
JUNE 87 
DEC. 87 
JUNE 88 
DEC. 88 
JUNE 89 
DEC. 89 
JUNE 9 0 
DEC. 90 
JUNE 91 
DEC. 91 
TRAFFIC 
REVENUE 
(Mil.$) 
833 
834 
934 
935 
878 
878 
1003 
1003 
1226 
1227 
1084 
1084 
the Data Used for the Regression 
NUMBER 
OF GATES 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
13 
13 
211 
211 
211 
211 
U.S. GDP 
GROWTH 
(%) 
5.7% 
5.7% 
6.4% 
6.4% 
7.9% 
7.9% 
7.0% 
7.0% 
5.1% 
5.1% 
2.9% 
2.9% 
CURRENCY 
RATE 
(cents / 
guilder) 
40.4 
45.6 
48.6 
56.3 
48.7 
50.0 
45.4 
52.2 
53.2 
59.2 
51.7 
51.7 
KLM's 
FARE 
(US $) 
$ 815 
$ 850 
$ 850 
$ 875 
$ 900 
$ 900 
$ 915 
$ 950 
$ 995 
$1055 
$1129 
$1197 
Source (Traffic Revenue) 
(Gates) 
(GDP) 
(Currency Rate) 
(KLM's Fare) 
KLM's Annual Financial reports. 
NW/KLM's Annual Financial reports 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
KLM's annual Financial Report. 
J. Thon, U.S. Department of 
Transportation 
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Regression Model Calibration. To investigate whether 
KLM's traffic revenue will increase after an alliance with 
Northwest Airlines, a correlation analysis was included in 
the regression analysis. KLM's aggregate traffic revenue 
was set as the dependant variable with the number of U.S. 
gates set as an independent variable. 
However, realizing that a single independent variable 
may not render reliable regression results, other 
independent variables were added to obtain a better fit or 
explanation of the dependant variable (KLM's traffic 
revenue). Consequently, the student chose the U.S. GDP 
growth rate, KLM's average economy fare from Amsterdam, 
Netherlands, to St. Paul/Minneapolis, and the currency 
exchange rate between U.S. cents and Netherlands Guilders as 
the other independent variables. 
The reason for selecting these variables was to offset 
the overstatement of KLM's traffic revenue. To be more 
precise, the student hypothesized that a healthy U.S. 
economy could create the big possibility of inducing more 
leisure traffic demand through increased disposable income 
by every citizen. Furthermore, higher fare levels for every 
KLM passenger could increase the operational yield, 
increasing the actual amount of traffic revenue. Lastly, a 
favorable foreign exchange rate between the Netherlands and 
the U.S. could also increase the actual traffic revenue. 
Hence, the student concluded that the aforementioned 
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variables must be included in the regression analysis in 
order to eliminate the possibility of overstating KLM's 
traffic revenue, and to obtain a more accurate correlation 
relationship between the traffic revenue and the number of 
increased gates. 
By performing a regression analysis with these 
variables, the goal was to obtain a correlation coefficient 
that shows a statistically significant relationship between 
the dependant and the independent variables. For example, 
if the coefficient between traffic revenue and gates 
resulted in a -1.00, this would mean that traffic revenue is 
inversely related to the number of gates; therefore, traffic 
revenue would decrease when the number of gates increases. 
On the other hand, a coefficient of +1.00 suggests that 
traffic revenue will increase with an increased number of 
gates. T-Statistics were used to investigate whether the 
regression coefficients were statistically significant based 
on the sample size or simply due to chance. 
The student used two investigative instruments to 
calibrate the regression model. One was the Lotus 1-2-3 
Release 2.2 and the other was the Stat + software program. 
Both programs were used for running the regression analysis 
and obtaining outputs. 
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C. Analysis of the Regression Model and Findings 
The study of a multiple regression analysis contains 
various objectives. It can be used to forecast traffic 
revenues and/or can be utilized to test a quantitative 
relationship between variables. In this thesis, the 
multiple regression analysis is used to investigate the 
quantitative relationship between the dependant and the 
independent variables. However, it is crucial to note that 
this investigation does not prove the cause and effect 
between the variables. The specific regression elements the 
student wishes to uncover are the correlation coefficient of 
the dependant and the independent variables, the constant 
for the regression equation, the coefficients of every 
independent variables, and the T-Statistic ratios for every 
independent variable. Before analyzing the results of the 
multiple regression, the student will list and define the 
outputs of the multiple regression analysis. 
The regression equation obtained through the multiple 
regression analysis is as follows : 
Yi = 521.77 + 5.29X1 + 1.61X2 + 30.96X3 - 0.10X4 + E 
Yi = The dependant variable (KLM's traffic revenue) 
XI = Number of KLM's U.S. gates 
X2 = Currency exchange rate 
X3 = U.S. GDP growth rate 
X4 = KLM's average economy fare 
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The calibrated equation can be used to predict the 
changes in KLM's traffic revenue by inserting values for the 
independent variables. However, the logic of this model 
must be defined first. In this particular model, the 
student hypothesized that KLM's traffic revenue will 
fluctuate depending upon a corporate alliance with Northwest 
Airlines. Therefore, if one can measure or represent a 
corporate alliance using the four independent variables 
(X1,X2,X3,X4), then the model suggests that KLM's traffic 
revenue would increase upon the increase of all the 
independent variables, except for KLM's average economy 
fare. 
There may be an inverse relationship between fare level 
and traffic revenue. Rigas Doganis theorizes that "the 
relationship between price changes and the demand for air 
travel can be measured by the price elasticity of 
demand."20 Using this price elasticity of demand theory, 
KLM's total traffic revenue will decrease as the fares 
charged by KLM increase when the overall demand is elastic. 
The regression equation supports this finding as traffic 
revenue (Yi) is inversely related to fares (X4). Therefore, 
if the overall demand is elastic, the findings of the 
regression equation are correct. However, if the overall 
demand is inelastic, the results of the regression equation 
20Rigas Doganis, "Airline Marketing - The Role of Passenger 
Demand," Flying Off Course, (New York: Routledge, Chapman, and 
Hall, 1992), p. 221. 
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can be distorted. A more thorough analysis of the 
regression results must be performed to draw any conclusions 
of the regression model. 
In Table 5, the constant value of 521.77 indicates the 
value of the dependant variable's Y-intercept. To be more 
specific, the dependant variable equals the constant when 
all independent variables equal zero. 
Table 5. Regression Analysis Output 
CONSTANT 
Std. Err. of Y Est. 
R SQUARED 
No. of OBSERVATIONS 
DEGREES of FREEDOM 
521.77 
63.60 
0.87 
12 
7 
The Standard Error of Estimate (+/- 63.6 million 
dollars) provides the changes in the regression formula's 
estimate of KLM's traffic revenue. The lower the standard 
error of estimate, the better the regression equation is at 
predicting the actual value of the dependant variable. 
The R Squared for the multiple regression is 0.87 or 
87%. Generally, R Squared values in excess of 0.90 or 90% 
are preferred. The R Squared value of 87% suggests a strong 
relationship between the variations of the dependant and the 
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chosen independent variables. To be more precise, 87% of 
KLM's variations in traffic revenue can be explained by the 
variations of the independent variables, which are the 
growth of U.S. GDP, KLM's average economy fare, number of 
KLM's U.S. gates, and the currency exchange rate between the 
U.S. and the Netherlands. The remaining 13% affecting the 
outcome of the variations in KLM's traffic revenue may come 
from other external and/or internal influences, such as 
KLM's in-flight service quality levels and/or degree of 
commitment to advertising expenditures. 
Another statistic used to evaluate the overall 
significance of a regression equation is the F Statistic. 
For a small sample size, it is a more useful measure than 
the R Squared. For the regression equation, the value of 
the F Statistic is 11.22. Considering the degrees of 
freedom (7), the number of observations (12), and the 
confidence level (95%), the F Statistic value must exceed 
3.09 to imply that the equation as a whole is significant. 
Therefore, a F Statistic value of 11.26 indicates that the 
calculated regression equation as a whole is significant for 
this particular regression model. 
Table 6 gives the residual values of the dependant 
variable (KLM's traffic revenue). The residual is the 
difference between the actual reported KLM traffic revenue 
and the values calculated or estimated by the regression 
equation. Ideally, residual values should satisfy the 
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Table 6. Residual Values for the Dependant Variable 
YEAR 
JUNE 1986 
DECEMBER 1986 
JUNE 1987 
DECEMBER 19 87 
JUNE 1988 
DECEMBER 19 88 
JUNE 1989 
DECEMBER 1989 
JUNE 1990 
DECEMBER 19 9 0 
JUNE 1991 
DECEMBER 1991 
RESIDUAL VALUE 
-9.40 
-33.26 
30.22 
-7.90 
-68.03 
-74.91 
99.02 
66.72 
30.11 
4.64 
-22 .20 
-15.10 
homoscedasticity assumption which says that the variance of 
the actual and calculated values are constant over the 
entire range of the dependant variable. The residual values 
appear to be heteroscedastic. The analysis of residuals is 
given in Appendix A. Heteroscedasticity occurs when the 
variances of the residuals either increases or decreases 
over the range of the dependent variables. The results 
suggest the regression equation is not as robust or reliable 
as possible. The small number of observations may have 
contributed to this result. 
An autocorrelation analysis can be used to determine if 
the R Squared of the regression equation is artificially 
inflated or if the residuals are correlated with each other. 
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If the residuals are autocorrelated, the strength of the 
relationship between the dependant and the independent 
variables may be exaggerated. The Durbin-Watson statistic 
is used to test for autocorrelation of residuals. In this 
regression model, the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic 
is 1.55. A Durbin-Watson value of 1.5 suggests there is no 
autocorrelation present in the regression model. Therefore, 
the student's regression model is not autocorrelated. 
However, a more detailed analysis with more observations is 
recommended since the Durbin-Watson statistic value (1.55) 
is borderline. 
Table 7 provides the T-Statistic values for all of the 
selected independent variables. The procedure for 
interpreting these values involves a hypothesis testing 
procedure. The initial stage is to utilize and examine a 
table that displays how large a coefficient needs to be in 
order to be significant at a given probability level. A 
confidence level of 95%, or an alpha level of +/- 5%, 
implying the probability of a Type I error is +/- 5%, was 
used to analyze the regression coefficients. Hence, the 
numerical T- Statistic value for every independent variable 
of this regression must exceed +/- 1.89 (two tailed test) to 
reject the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient 
is equal to zero. Table 7 reveals that the only independent 
variable that provides a T-Statistic value that is 
statistically significant is the number of KLM's U.S gates, 
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Table 7. Regression Coefficient and T Statistics 
X VARBLS. 
OUTPUT 
X Coef. 
Std. Err. 
of Coef. 
T Stat. 
XI 
GATES 
5.29 
5.24 
3 .17 
X2 
CURRENCY 
1.61 
0.51 
1.32 
X3 
GDP 
30.96 
23.55 
1.01 
X4 
FARE 
-0.10 
0.35 
-0.30 
with a T-Statistic value of 3.17. The variations in the 
U.S. economic growth rate, KLM's fare structure, and the 
currency exchange rate between the U.S. and the Netherlands 
are not statistically significant with respect to the 
variations of KLM's traffic revenue. 
Based on the regression analysis findings, the 
variations in the number of KLM's U.S. gates seems to have 
an influence on the variations of KLM's traffic revenue. 
However, variations of the other independent variables have 
an inconclusive impact on the variations of KLM's traffic 
revenue. There could be numerous reasons for this. 
First, the numerical fluctuations of the independent 
variables, besides the number of KLM's U.S. gates, could 
have been too severe considering the relatively short time 
span of the observations. This point can be seen in Table 
4. The values of the GDP and the currency rates do not have 
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consistent trends; therefore, a regular or predictable 
growth pattern or cycle cannot be observed. Hence, the 
small number of observations probably reduced the 
statistical significance of the two variables. If the study 
were to observe at least two or more economic cycles and 
divide it into quarterly observations (32 observations), 
higher T-Statistic values would be expected for the 
remaining independent variables, including KLM's U.S. number 
of gates. 
To supplement the study of the correlation relationship 
between the dependant and the independent variables, the 
results of the correlation matrix have been calculated and 
are shown in Table 8. The purpose of this correlation 
matrix is to study multicollinearity, or the correlation 
relationship between the dependant and the independent 
variables, and also the relationship between the independent 
variables. 
When referring to Table 8, the correlation between the 
dependant and the independent variables shows a strong 
positive relationship except for GDP. GDP has a negative 
relationship with the dependant variable (-0.54). 
Generally, correlation coefficients of at least +/- 0.60 are 
considered strong enough to be included in the model. This 
finding supports the theory that the variations of KLM's 
traffic revenue can be explained by the variations of the 
independent variables. However, the negative relationship 
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between KLM's traffic revenue and GDP is hard to explain, 
When looking at the regression equation, the only 
Table 8. Correlation 
VRBLS 
REV. 
GATES 
GDP 
CRNCY. 
FARE 
REV. 
1.00 
0.87 
-0.54 
0.69 
0.73 
Matrix 
GATES 
0.87 
1.00 
-0.82 
0.54 
0.88 
GDP 
-0.54 
-0.82 
1.00 
-0.22 
-0.77 
CRNCY. 
0.69 
0.54 
-0.22 
1.00 
0.52 
FARE 
0.73 
0.88 
-0.77 
0.52 
1.00 
independent variable having an inverse relationship is KLM's 
fare level, not the GDP. 
The second use of the correlation matrix is to test for 
multicollinearity or if there are any strong correlations 
among the independent variables. If a multicollinearity 
relationship exists between the independent variables, the 
overall regression results can be ambiguous.21 Generally, 
correlations that are 80% or higher are considered 
unacceptable.22 Referring to Table 8, gates and GDP (-
0.82), gates and fare (+0.88), and GDP and fares (-0.77) are 
strongly correlated to each other. Therefore, the student 
21Bertram Price and Samprit Chatterjee, "Analysis of 
Collinear Data," Regression Analysis by Example (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1991), p. 173. 
22Donald R. Cooper and William C. Emory, "Multivariate 
Analysis:An Overview," Business Research Methods (Boston, MA.: 
Richard D. Irwin, 1991), p. 634. 
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must exercise extreme caution about drawing any substantive 
conclusions based on a regression analysis in the presence 
of multicollinearity. A strategy to overcome this result is 
to delete KLM's fare from the regression model or substitute 
a new variable. However, it is important to know that 
multicollinearity is not a modeling error. It is a 
condition of deficient data. In the sub section titled 
"Model Variables and Data Sources", the limitations of 
selecting KLM's fare level was introduced. Based on the 
given circumstance, it is not practical or possible to 
improve or change the data. Therefore, the student feels 
that focusing on conscious interpretation of the given data 
and the regression results is the most effective method of 
analysis. 
This multiple regression analysis suggests that a 
substantial proportion of the variations in KLM's traffic 
revenue can be explained by the variations of KLM's number 
of U.S. gates. Furthermore, this underlying fact is 
statistically significant, as proven by the acceptable T-
Statistic value. Therefore, one can conclude that KLM's 
traffic revenue will increase as it increases its access to 
U.S. gates. Hence, implementing a corporate alliance with 
the Northwest Airlines seems to have benefitted KLM in terms 
of traffic revenue. 
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D- Critical Evaluation of the Analysis and the Study's 
Limitations 
The student investigated the benefits of a strong 
corporate alliance between KLM and Northwest Airlines using 
a multiple regression analysis. The reported results 
generally support the logical expectation or widely accepted 
view that alliances are beneficial. However, the results 
are not as strong or robust as the writer would prefer. 
First, a corporate alliance is one of the most modern, 
if not the newest, trend in the global air transport 
industry. Therefore, it is difficult to obtain a long time 
series of data involving corporate alliances between 
international airlines. The only quantitative study of the 
numerical benefit(s) of an alliance(s) available was 
reported by Richard Whitaker and Mead Jennings in an Airline 
Business article that dealt with the proposed alliance 
between the British Airways and USAir. They estimated that 
cost savings of more than one percent can be achieved 
through a corporate alliance between British Airways and 
USAir ranging from "purchasing to yield management and from 
catering to engineering which could result to the sum of 
more than $14 billion U.S. dollars for both carriers".23 
However, there are internal studies done by the airlines to 
investigate the quantitative benefits of an alliance, but 
23Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines oppose BA's 
and US deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p.31. 
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public access to those findings is restricted. In summary, 
there is little published, hard quantitative evidence to 
support or disprove the value of a corporate alliance, or to 
express its value in quantitative terms. 
Second, obtaining financial information to conduct a 
quantitative study on a corporate alliance(s) is difficult 
because it involves sensitive, proprietary internal 
information. For example, load-factor figures on KLM's 
flights between St. Paul/Minneapolis and Amsterdam, 
Netherlands, were requested from KLM but were not provided, 
for competitive reasons. Therefore, the student had to 
conduct his quantitative study relying solely on publicly 
available financial information. For example, to study 
whether the variations in KLM's traffic revenue can be 
explained by the variations in the independent variables, 
KLM's traffic revenue figures should have only included the 
traffic revenue generated from the U.S. But, these figures 
were not available. As a result, the correlation between 
the dependant and the independent variables could be over or 
understated utilizing KLM's total traffic revenue. To be 
more specific, we do not know how much of KLM's overall 
traffic revenue was generated by the St.Paul/Minneapolis and 
Amsterdam route, specifically. If the majority of KLM's 
traffic revenues were produced by the U.S. market, the R 
Squared between the dependant and the independent variables 
should be larger. Hence, the regression model may have 
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distorted results. 
The average economy fare, one of the independent 
variables, is also difficult to establish or measure. There 
are more than 150 different fare levels on this particular 
route. For simplicity, an average economy fare was selected 
to represent all of the fares charged. However, if a 
different fare were chosen from the 150, a different result 
might have been produced. 
Another element complicating the quantitative analysis 
is' the inability to quantify the added benefits of a 
corporate alliance(s). As the literature review reveals, 
the "seamless product" concept may contribute numerous 
intangible benefits in addition to the increase in traffic 
revenue for the respective airlines. For example, the 
loyalty for selecting KLM and/or Northwest Airlines over 
other competitors can be enhanced from the existing and 
potential demand due to the increase in passenger 
convenience. Hence, the dependant variable of KLM's traffic 
revenue may have a strong correlation with other independent 
variables not included in the regression analysis. 
Finally, the values used to study KLM's quantitative 
alliance benefits with Northwest Airlines begins from 1990. 
Consequently, the number of needed observations to run an 
effective multiple regression analysis turned out to be much 
less than the student initially desired. This shows up in 
the analysis of the T-Statistics. 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE STUDY 
A. Summary of Findings 
There are three forms of airline alliances; these are: 
simple alliance, strong alliance, and corporate merger. The 
three alliances are differentiated depending upon the amount 
of capital investment and the variation in the form of the 
functional agreements between airlines. 
The three types of alliances present different 
advantages and disadvantages for airlines seeking to use an 
alliance as a corporate strategy to compete domestically 
and/or globally. Therefore, each airline must conduct a 
careful analysis to determine its needs and circumstances 
before implementing a particular alliance. 
The student used a regression analysis to study whether 
implementing an alliance has any measurable quantitative 
gains or losses for the respective airlines. The 
KLM/Northwest Airlines alliance was selected as a case 
analysis. The main reason is that KLM and Northwest 
Airlines were the first major airlines to develop a strong 
alliance in 1989. 
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For the regression model, KLM's aggregate semi-annual 
traffic revenue was chosen as the dependant variable. The 
independent variables consisted of U.S. GDP growth rate, the 
currency exchange rate between Netherlands Guilders and U.S. 
cents, KLM's average one-way economy fare from Amsterdam to 
St. Paul/Minneapolis, and the number of KLM's U.S. gates 
from 1986 to 1991. 
In this thesis, the regression equation suggests that 
KLM's traffic revenue will increase as all the independent 
variables increase, except for KLM's average economy fare. 
There seem to be an inverse relationship between fare level 
and traffic revenue due to elasticity of demand. 
The regression equation is significant based on R 
Squared and the F statistic. The R Squared is 0.87 or 87% 
and the F Statistic is 11.22. However, the residual values 
of the dependant variable suggest that the regression 
equation is not as robust or reliable as desired. This is 
because the residual values appear to be heteroscedastic. 
The regression model is not autocorrelated since the 
Durbin-Watson statistic value is 1.55. This implies that 
the R Squared of the regression equation is not artificially 
inflated and the residuals of the dependant variables are 
not correlated to each other. 
The T-statistic values imply that thr number of KLM's 
U.S. gates is the only independent variable that is 
statistically significant (3.17). The other independent 
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variables have an inconclusive impact on the variations of 
KLM's traffic revenue. 
The correlation matrix provides information that shows 
a multicollinearity relationship between gates and GDP, fare 
and gates, and GDP and fares. If a multicollinearity 
relationship exists between the independent variables, the 
overall regression results can be ambiguous. However, this 
does not mean that there is a modeling error. It is a 
condition resulting from deficient data. 
The reported results generally support the logical 
expectation or widely accepted view that alliances are 
beneficial. However, the results are not as strong or 
robust as the writer would prefer. The hardship in 
obtaining a long time series of data involving corporate 
alliances between international airlines has been a key 
contributing factor. A greater number of observations is a 
critical need to conduct a thorough study. 
In summary, the regression model suggests that a 
substantial proportion of the variations in KLM's traffic 
revenue can be explained by the variations of KLM's number 
of U.S. gates. This result is statistically significant as 
proven by the significance of the regression equation and 
the T-Statistic value. However, variations of other 
independent variables have an inconclusive impact on the 
variations of KLM's traffic revenue. Therefore, the student 
can conclude that KLM's traffic revenue will increase as 
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they increase their access to U.S. gates. 
The hypothesis that KLM's traffic revenue will increase 
depending upon an alliance with Northwest Airlines has been 
proven. Thus, KLM has benefited from the alliance with 
Northwest Airlines as their number of U.S. gates increased. 
B. Recommendation for Future Study 
There are three recommendations the student wishes to 
make for future study. First, this thesis can be studied 
more thoroughly using an increased number of observations 
and/or different dependant and/or independent variables. 
The data will certainly be available as years go by. With 
an increased number of observations, the results of the 
regression model will be more accurate and significant. The 
usage of other variables will provide information that has 
not been covered by this thesis. These findings can enhance 
the overall study of the KLM/NW Airlines alliance case. 
Second, another alliance case can be used to study the 
benefits of an alliance. The most recent alliance approved 
by the U.S. Department of Transportation (in 1993) is an 
alliance between British Airways and USAir. As this thesis 
documents, this particular alliance is carefully monitored 
by numerous USAir competitors. Therefore, studying the 
development and the results of this alliance can be 
extremely useful and interesting. 
Finally, a qualitative study regarding the challenges 
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of an alliance is recommended. This thesis indicates that 
disputes over cultural differences can spoil the prosperity 
of an alliance. Also, the concept of "our way of doing 
things is best" can effect the viability of an alliance. 
Hence, a thorough analysis of conflicts in cultural and 
operational differences between alliance partners can be 
beneficial regarding the study of an alliance. 
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A Graphical Analysis of KLM's Traffic Revenue Residuals 
Graph 1. KLM's Traffic Revenue Residuals 
Residual 
Values ° 
(CO ?Cc /cap /JCO . 
Y = KLM's Traffic Revenue (Mil. U.S. $) 
APPENDIX B: KLM'S ACTUAL vs. CALCULATED 
TRAFFIC REVENUE AND RESIDUALS 
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Table 9. Actual vs. Calculated KLM's Traffic Revenue and 
Residuals 
YEAR 
JUNE 86 
DEC. 86 
JUNE 87 
DEC. 87 
JUNE 88 
DEC. 88 
JUNE 89 
DEC. 89 
JUNE 9 0 
DEC. 90 
JUNE 91 
DEC. 91 
ACTUAL TRAFFIC 
REVENUE (Mil.$) 
833 
834 
934 
935 
878 
878 
1003 
1003 
1226 
1227 
1084 
1084 
CALCULATED 
TRAFFIC REVENUE 
(Mil $) 
843 
867 
904 
942 
946 
953 
904 
936 
1196 
1222 
1106 
1099 
TRAFFIC 
REVENUE 
RESIDUALS 
- 9.40 
-33 .25 
30.22 
- 7.90 
-68.04 
-74.91 
99.02 
66.72 
30.11 
4.64 
-22.20 
-15.07 
Source : Values obtained through Stat+ software program 
